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Abstract 
The objective of this paper is to analyze the effect of firms' heterogeneity 
on their incentives to merge. To reach this target, merger decisions are 
modelled as endogenous. To simplify the analysis, we focus on the extreme 
case where merger leads to monopolization. Kamien and Zang (1990 and 1993) 
give monopolization conditions in static and dynamic acquisition games. 
Introducing cost heterogeneity in a n-firm industry, we provide more general 
monopolization conditions. Indeed, we show that any industry can be 
monopolized if cost heterogeneity is large enough. This result provides new 
informations to competition authorities on concentration possibilities and 
allows them to focus particularly on some industries. 
JEL classification: L12; L41.
Keywords: Competition Policy, Cost Heterogeneity, Endogenous Mergers, 
Monopolization. 
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    1  Introduction 
The literature on horizontal mergers presents different types of analyses. 
Williamson (1968) shows that mergers have positive effects on welfare. But, 
this idea has often been contradicted. In this sense, competition authorities 
develop a good tool to monitor mergers. Studies suggest, as Charléty and 
Souam (2002), that ex-ante competition policy is more efficient and less 
expensive than ex-post. For this reason, analyses of merger conditions have 
appeared. For example, Salant, Switzer, and Reynolds (1983) study incentives 
to participate to mergers, by considering them as exogenous phenomena. 
Finally, to take into account decisions of firms' owners in merger processes, 
other authors (for instance Fridolfsson and Stennek [2005], Horn and Persson 
[2001]) have modelled endogenous merger processes. The main interest of 
these studies is to give informations to competition authorities on concentration 
possibilities and allows them to focus particularly on some industries. 
Using the same framework, we try to answer a related question: what are 
merger processes conditions? Because merger decisions are endogenous in our 
model, we simplify the analysis by concentrating on monopolization processes. 
In the same way, Kamien and Zang (1990, 1993) considered two acquisition 
games in which symmetric firms compete "à la Cournot" and a single owner is 
able to purchase firms. They show on the one hand that, in a static game, 
monopolization is not possible in industries larger than duopolies. On the other 
hand, they show in a dynamic game that monopolization is not possible in 
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industries larger than triopolies. Our model is based on the Kamien and Zang 
models (1990 and 1993) and shows that firms' heterogeneity increases the 
incentives to merge. 
Following Gowrisankaran and Holmes (2004) we introduce cost 
heterogeneity between firms and concentrate on the merger incentives of the 
most efficient firm. Gowrisankaran and Holmes (2004) present a complex 
model using Markov Perfect Equilibrium concept. This model allows them to 
take into account investment decisions but it cannot be solved analytically. For 
this reason, we present a model without investment decisions. We find that 
monopolization conditions are then less restrictive. Indeed, this paper presents 
static and dynamic acquisition games in which the owner of the most efficient 
firm attempts to buy the other firms. We find that monopolization is always 
possible if cost heterogeneity is large enough. This result supports the "takeover 
waves" explanation of  Fauli-Oller (2000) based on cost asymmetries. But 
Faulli-Oller (2000) considered a four-firm industry in which two firms are more 
efficient than the two others. Moreover, he underlines the role of negative 
shocks of demand on the profitability of takeovers. Assuming a low realization 
of demand, we propose to focus on a main topic: monopolization of a n-firm 
industry in which a single firm is more efficient than others.    
The rest of the paper is organized as follow. In the second section, we 
present the static acquisition game. The third section is dedicated to the 
dynamic game. Finally, we conclude on contributions of the cost heterogeneity 
assumption.  
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2 The static game 
We focus on n-firm industries and we define by {1, 2,., ,.., }N i n=  the 
initial set of firms3. A firm must be sold in one part. Note that each firm is 
initially owned by an individual owner but if an owner bought other firms, he 
adopts a behaviour corresponding to a single entity. Note 
1
n
i
i
Q
=
= q∑  with    
the individual output of firm i. 
iq
The inverse demand function for the unique good is given by ( ) 1P Q Q= − . 
We note the linear cost function of each firm ( )i iC q c qi=  with i  {1, 2, ..., }n∈  
.   can take two values:  for the most efficient firm and ic 1c c  for the other 
symmetric firms. Note that [0, 1]ic ∈  {1, 2,..., }i n∀ ∈  and 1c c≤ . 
We consider a three stage game: in the first stage, the owner of the most 
efficient firm4 makes bids for the other firms and owners of the other firms give 
an asking price for their own firm. In the second stage, the dominant firm 
decides how many firms he wants to operate. In the third one, Cournot 
competition takes place in the industry. 
We must note that this game is a game with perfect information. For 
example, firms are totally informed of consequences of buying another firm, or 
conversely, to be purchased. Hence, an inefficient firm cannot earn more than a 
                                                 
3It's assumed that entries in the industry are not allowed.  
4We assume that the firm 1 is the only one who makes bids. Even if we can prove that an 
inefficient firm have the same incentive to monopolize the industry, firm 1 seems closer to 
realize this monopolization. Indeed, his previous profits are higher because of his low cost. It 
could always spend more than inefficient firms if these last were allowed to make bids.  
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duopoly profit if it unilaterally deviates from its selling. Therefore, it cannot ask 
for more than this price. Secondly, the first firm earns more by purchasing a 
firm, spending the duopoly profit of this last, rather than by not purchasing this 
firm. 
 
Consider the three stages of the game: 
In the first one, firm 1 makes bids for all other firms. Simultaneously, other 
owners give an asking price for their own firms. Note  
 the vector of bids announced by the first owner. The  
  bid is the bid for the  firm. Note 
2( ,..., ,..., ) Ri nB b b b= ∈
ib
thi 2( ,..., ,..., ) Ri nO o o o= ∈  the vector of 
asking prices announced by the owners  to  . The  asking price 
correspond to the  firm asking price. We note 
2 n io
thi K  the number of firms owned 
by the first owner after this stage. In the second stage, the first owner decides 
how many firms he is going to operate among his K  firms. As cost functions 
are linear, he always decides to operate only the most efficient. Therefore, it is 
not necessary to analyse this stage. The question is to know how many firms 
remain after the dominant firm buys out competitive fringe firms.  In the third 
stage, owners simultaneously decide output levels. 
In this game, we characterize monopoly Nash Equilibrium in pure 
strategies5. Strategies are defined, for each owner, by a bid vector and by an 
                                                                                                                                  
 
5To simplify the analysis and concentrate on the emergence of monopoly, we exclude 
acquisition path without monopolization. Nevertheless, given that the level of cost 
heterogeneity, other equilibria than monopoly can be more profitable. 
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output quantity. Owner's outcome is the sum of profits and transaction cash 
flow. There is monopolization if and only if the first owner's monopoly profit 
minus acquisition costs exceeds his opportunity cost. We analyze this payoff in 
order to determine if the dominant firm is able to make bids to buy out all the 
competitive fringe firms. As a firm unilaterally refusing to be sold potentially 
earns a duopoly profit, the acquisition cost is, for each firm, the profit earned in 
competition with the first firm. The behaviour of the firms asking for a duopoly 
profit can be seen as an hold up mechanism. The opportunity cost is the profit 
of the first firm if it does not buy any firm. 
We note  with 1( , )
n
i c cπ [ ]1, 2 ,i∈  [2, [n∈ +∞  the profit of firm i  in a n-
firm industry with  the marginal cost of firm 1 and c  the marginal cost of the  
 other firms. Profits of the firm 1 are given by 
1c
1n− 1.i =  Given that every other 
firm is symmetric, firms profits are given by 2i = . Given individual marginal 
costs ci and the linear inverse demand ( ) 1P Q Q= − , then firms profits in the n-
firm problem are given by Letho and Tombak (1998): 
(1 )²
( 1)²
i j i
nc c
n
≠− +
+
j∑
                                            (1) 
We can establish the monopoly profit of the firm 1: 
1 1
1 1
(1 )²( )
4
ccπ −=  
We can give the opportunity cost of the firm 1 (the profit realized by this firm if 
it buys no firm): 
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1nc1 ,c  1 − nc1  n − 1c²n  1²  
Finally, the acquisition cost of an inefficient firm takes the following form: 
 
22c1 ,c  1 − 2c  c1²9  
If    firms are initially present in the industry, the monopolization condition is: n
1 2
1 1 2 1 1 1( ) ( 1) ( , ) ( , )
nc n c c c cπ π π− − ≥                            (2) 
(2) holds if (3) is checked: 
1( , )c c n c≥                                              (3) 
with  
1 1 1
1
(4 ² 35 13 4 ² 23 )1( , )
2 (4 ² 17 5)
c n c n c n nc n c
n n
+ + + − −= + −  
 Lemma 1 Let  [ ]1 0, 1c ∈   and  [2, [,n∈ +∞   then It always exists a [ ]0, 1c∈   
verifying  111 2( , ) cc n c c +≤ ≤ . 
 Proof To exclude negative profits, sustainable industry conditions must also be 
checked. One of these conditions is 11 2
cc +≤ . Indeed, firm 1 is the only one to 
produce if and only if 11 2
cc +≥ . But, two other sustainable industry conditions 
are assumed in our model, that are: [ ]0, 1c∈  and [ ]1 0, 1 .c ∈  Thereby, 
11
2 1
c+ ≤ . As, [ ]1 0, 1c∀ ∈  and [2, [,n∀ ∈ +∞  111 2( , ) ,cc n c +≤  we can state 
that it always exists  [ ]0, 1c∈   which respects 111 2( , ) 1.cc n c c +≤ ≤ ≤   
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Proposition 1 Let [ ]0, 1 ,c∈  [ ]1 0, 1c ∈  and [2, [,n∈ +∞  then a 
monopolization path of a n-firm industry exists if and only if  1( , ).c c n c≥    
 
This result is intuitive because monopoly profits are more sensitive to 
efficiency than profits in any other market structure. Indeed we have shown that 
monopolization is possible for every size of industry if the cost heterogeneity is 
large enough. 
Note that  11, [0, 1],n c∀ > ∀ ∈ 1( , ) 0.c n cn∂ ∂ >  Subsequently, the larger the 
industry is, the stronger the cost heterogeneity must be to have monopolization. 
In the symmetric case, that is for 1c c=  , we find, like Kamien and Zang 
(1990), that industries larger than two firms cannot be monopolized. 
 
3 The dynamic game: 
We have shown that monopolization is feasible in large industries if the 
cost structure is heterogeneous enough. If the game takes place in several 
rounds, we see that cost structure conditions are modified. Indeed, to buy out 
firms become less expensive in the dynamic game because of the disappearance 
of the hold up mechanism previously identified. The sellers cannot ask for 
duopoly profits as the monopolization can appear in several rounds and not 
only in the next round. Consequently, if the discount factor is 1, that is without 
actualization rate, every industry monopolized in the static game is also 
monopolized in several rounds. 
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We show that a dynamic analysis increases the number of monopolization 
opportunities even if the discount factor is smaller than 1. This demonstration 
provides the proof that dynamic modelling makes monopolization easier. 
Keeping the same assumptions and taking into account that the number of 
firms can decrease between two rounds, we extend the three stages of the static 
game on an infinite horizon. Note that game participants are perfectly 
informed6. We note 11 rδ +=  the discount factor, where  is the interest rate. 
When it is not specified, conditions and propositions are established with 
r
δ  
and  between 0 and 1. 1c
In the two next sections, we provide two illustrations of the dynamic game 
because the n-firm generalization is very complex. First, we study the case of a 
three-firm industry and second we analyze the case of a four-firm industry. 
 
3.1 With a three-firm industry: 
We exclude the one round case because it is equivalent to the static 
monopolization case.  
We assume that there are two rounds because it is easy to prove that a path 
with more than two rounds does not provide an advantage to the first owner7. 
Thus, one firm is purchased in the first round and another is bought in the next 
round. 
                                                 
6In particular, the remaining firms are informed of the previous buying.  
7To buy one firm per round is the most advantageous path to reach monopolization (see Kamien 
and Zang (1993)). 
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Again, we must analyze conditions of these two acquisitions. Hence a 
backward induction arguing is followed, that is: 
Second round: 
After the second stage, if the dominant firm monopolized the industry, it 
earns an infinite monopoly profit flow. 
To obtain this payoff, it must pay the acquisition cost of the remaining 
firm. As this last firm could earn a duopoly profit by deviating from its own sell 
off, the firm 1 will have to pay this duopoly profit to monopolize the industry.  
The dominant firm could earn an infinite flow of duopoly profits by paying 
no firm. Therefore, when this last one monopolizes the industry, its opportunity 
cost is this infinite flow of duopoly profit (proof in appendix A):                                                              
1 2 2
1 1 2 1 1 1( ) ( , ) ( , )
(1 ) (1 ) (1 )
c c c cπ π π c
δ δ δ− ≥− − −                                  (4) 
(4) holds if (5) is checked:                                                                                                                            
1
11 1
10 10
c c− ≤                                               (5) 
First round: 
At the first stage, in order to monopolize the industry in the following 
stage, the firm 1 has to buy one firm. To buy the other one, it has to pay an 
infinite and discounted flow of triopoly profit. As the game is dynamic, the 
dominant firm can spread his takeovers over several rounds. Consequently, the 
hold up mechanism of the static game disappears. Moreover, when the firm 1 
buys a firm, it gives up his infinite and discounted flow of  triopoly profit. It is 
his opportunity cost. Nevertheless, it will earn a duopoly profit instead (proof in 
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appendix B): 
3 1 2 3
2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1
( , ) ( ) ( , ) ( , )( , )
(1 ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 )
c c c c c c cc c π π π ππ δδ δ δ
⎡ ⎤− + − ≥⎢ ⎥− − − −⎣ ⎦ δ            (6) 
(6) holds if (7) is checked: 
1( , )c c c δ∗≥                                            (7) 
with  
c∗c1 ,  12
13c1  22c1  1 − 2
10  7  
Lemma 2 Let [ ]1 0, 1c ∈  and [0, 1],δ ∈  then it always exists a  
verifying  
[0, 1]c∈
11
1 2( , )
cc c cδ +∗ ≤ ≤  . 
Proof. As seen in the previous section, the same sustainable industry conditions 
must be checked. Therefore, we establish that [ ]1 0, 1c∀ ∈  and [0, 1],δ∀ ∈    
11 1
110 10c − 111 2( , ) cc c δ +∗≤ ≤ . Then, we can state that it always exists [ ]0, 1c∈  
verifying 111 2( , ) 1.
cc c cδ +∗ ≤ ≤ ≤   
 
As the first round condition is the most restrictive, we can state the following 
proposition: 
Proposition 2 Let [ ]0, 1 ,c∈  [ ]1 0, 1c ∈  and  [0, 1],δ ∈  then a 
monopolization path of a three-firm industry exists if and only if 1( , ).c c c δ∗≥   
 
Here, we show that monopolization of a three-firm industry is possible for 
every [ ]0, 1δ ∈ , provided that the cost heterogeneity is large enough . In the 
Page 11 of 21
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
symmetric case, that is for 1c c= , we find, like Kamien and Zang (1993), that 
monopolization of a three-firm industry is possible if [ ]12 , 1δ ∈ . 
Note that 1[0, 1], [0, 1],cδ∀ ∈ ∀ ∈  1( , ) 0.c c δδ∗∂ ∂ ≤  This means that, the larger 
the discount factor is, the larger the monopolization possibilities are.8 Indeed, 
future profits are more valued while acquisition payments are spread over the 
time. 
Moreover, as the owner of the dominant firm does not have to monopolize 
the industry in an only one round, other owners cannot ask the duopoly profit 
for their firms: this fall of acquisition cost explains the monopolization facilities 
in a dynamic context. 
Note that, if , monopolization is feasible if and only if 1c c= δ  [ ]12 ; 1∈  . 
Therefore, we find again the result of Kamien and Zang (1993). 
 
3.2 With a four-firm industry: 
In this industry configuration, there are several monopolization paths, but 
we can prove that monopolization is easier with three rounds.  
Thus, we study this path. Let us solve by the same way:  
The conditions of the third and second stage are respectively the same than 
                                                 
8 1 1(3, ) ( , )c c c c δ∗≥  if and only if 1/ 22.δ ≥  Therefore, there are more monopolization 
possibilities in dynamic games than in static ones if 1/ 22.δ ≥   
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the conditions of the second and first stage in the appendix B. But there is 
another stage in which another firm is previously bought (cf. the proof in 
appendix A and B).                                                                                                                                      
Third round: the first owner buys the last firm:  
1 2 2
1 1 2 1 1 1( ) ( , ) ( , )
(1 ) (1 ) (1 )
c c c cπ π π c
δ δ δ− ≥− − −                               (8) 
(8) holds if (9) is checked: 
1
11 1
10 10
c c− ≤                                                 (9) 
Second round: the first owner buys another firm: 
3 1 2 3
2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1
( , ) ( ) ( , ) ( , )( , )
(1 ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 )
c c c c c c cc c π π π ππ δδ δ δ
⎡ ⎤− + − ≥⎢ ⎥− − − −⎣ ⎦ δ             (10) 
(10) holds if (11) is checked: 
1 113 22 1 21
2 10 7
c c cδ δδ
+ + − ≤+                                   (11) 
First round: the first owner buys one firm: 
At the first stage, in order to monopolize the industry in the following 
stage, the first firm has to buy one firm. To buy the other, it has to pay an 
infinite and discounted profit flow of a single firm in a four-firm industry. 
Indeed, the hold up mechanism of the static game does not exist. Moreover, by 
purchasing a firm, the firm 1 gives up his infinite and discounted profit flow of 
single firm in a four-firm industry. Nevertheless, it will earn a triopoly profit 
instead (proof in the appendix C):  
4 3
3 22 1 2 1
1 1 1 1
( , ) ( , )( , ) ( , )
(1 ) (1 )
c c c cc c c cπ ππ δ πδ δ
⎡ ⎤− + −⎢ ⎥− −⎣ ⎦
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1 2 4
2 1 1 1 1 1 1( ) ( , ) ( , )
(1 ) (1 ) (1 )
c c c cπ π πδ cδ δ δ
⎡ ⎤+ − ≥⎢ ⎥− − −⎣ ⎦
                             (12) 
(12) holds if (13) is checked: 
1( , )c c c δ≥ %                                              (13) 
with  
2 2
1 1 1
1 2
1100 650 423 100 50 63( , )
2(243 500 350 )
c c cc c δ δ δ δδ δ δ
+ + − + += + +
%  
Because of the lemma 2 and because [ ]1 0, 1c∀ ∈  and [0, 1],δ∀ ∈    
11 1
110 10c −  1 1 113 22 1 2 11 12 10 7 2( , ) ,c c cc cδ δδ δ+ + − ++≤ ≤ % ≤  we can state that it always 
exists a   verifying [0, 1]c∈ 111 2( , ) cc c cδ +≤ ≤% . 
 
As the first round condition is the most restrictive, we can state the 
following proposition: 
 Proposition 3 Let [ ]0, 1 ,c∈  [ ]1 0, 1c ∈  and [0, 1],δ ∈  then a 
monopolization path of a four-firm industry exists if and only if  1( , ).c c c δ≥ %   
 
Note that 1[0, 1], [0, 1],cδ∀ ∈ ∀ ∈  1( , ) 0.c c δδ∂ ∂ ≤%  This implies that, the 
larger the discount factor is, the larger the monopolization possibilities are. We 
state the following inequality: 
1( , )c c c δ≥ %                                              (14) 
The expression (14) implies that monopolization of a four symmetric firms 
industry is not possible. We can also say that there are more monopolization 
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possibilities in dynamic games than in static ones. Indeed, 1 1( , ) (4, ).c c c cδ ≤%   
These remarks are in line with the intuitions mentioned for three-firm 
industries, with the actualization effect and the dynamic effect. 
 
4    Conclusion: 
In this paper, we have shown that firms' heterogeneity increases the 
incentives to merge. Since the best method to value these incentives is to make 
endogenous merger decisions, we have built a model in which owners' 
decisions are taken into account. 
To simplify the analysis, we focused on the extreme case where merger 
leads to monopolization. 
Our results differ from Kamien and Zang (1990 and 1993). Indeed, these 
authors showed that large industries cannot be monopolized. Introducing a large 
enough cost heterogeneity, we have shown that monopolization is feasible for 
all industry sizes. Moreover, monopolization is easier if the game is a dynamic 
one and especially if the discount factor is high. To reach this conclusion, we 
provided two illustrations, for three and four firm-industry because in dynamic, 
the n-firm generalization is too complex. This result supports the "takeover 
waves" explanation of  Fauli-Oller (2000) based on cost asymmetries. 
Moreover, the following intuition explains it: the monopoly profit is more 
sensitive to a fall in production cost than oligopoly profit. 
Our results are also in contradiction with Gowrisankaran and Holmes 
(2004). They show that a large competitive industry stays a large competitive 
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industry. No merger appears in this case. On the contrary, our model shows that 
large industries can be monopolized if the cost heterogeneity is large enough. 
Nevertheless, extensions of this line of research are necessary to take into 
account data neglected in our model. These extensions should include several 
purchasers in these games, take into account decentralized games in which 
firms are individually managed, and at last, find oligopoly equilibria to these 
games, especially if collusion is possible. The aim of these studies would be to 
provide tools to anticipate concentration processes. Another research should be 
developed in parallel: a welfare analysis restricted to the cases of industry in 
which concentration processes are possible. 
The final aim of this research is to identify industries in which 
monopolization is not possible. Thus, authorities could concentrate on the other 
industries in order to determine the monopolization processes which could be 
detrimental to the global welfare. Moreover, as firms supposed to monopolize 
the industries are the most efficient, the possibilities of monopolization 
decreasing welfare are limited.  
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Appendix A
Given the individual marginal costs  and the linear inverse demand 
 the firm profits in the n-firm problem are given by Letho and 
Tombak (1998): 
ic
( ) 1 ,P Q Q= −
1 − nci ∑ j≠i cj²
n  1²  
We can give, concerning the second round, the monopoly profit of the first 
firm: 
2
1 1
1 1
(1 )( )
4
ccπ −=                                                (1) 
We can establish the opportunity cost of the firm 1 (profit realized by the first 
firm if it buys no firm): 
12c1 ,c  1 − 2c  c1
2
9  
The acquisition cost of a firm by the firm 1 is: 
22c1 ,c  1 − 2c1  c
2
9  
Hence, the second stage monopolization condition is (by actualizing infinite 
flow of profits): 
1 2 2
1 1 2 1 1 1( ) ( , ) ( , )
(1 ) (1 ) (1 )
c c c cπ π π c
δ δ δ− ≥− − −                                   (4) 
which is equivalent to: 
2 2
1 1(1 ) (1 2 ) (1 2 )
4(1 ) 9(1 ) 9(1 )
c c c c
δ δ
− − + − +− ≥− − −
2
1 c
δ  
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Appendix B
As in the appendix A: 
We can determinate, concerning the first round, the duopoly profit of the firm 
1: 
2 1
1 1
(1 2 )²( , )
9
c cc cπ − +=  
We can give the opportunity cost of the firm 1 (the profit realized by the first 
firm if it buys no firm): 
2
3 1
1 1
(1 3 2 )( , )
16
c cc cπ − +=  
We can establish the acquisition cost of a firm by the firm 1: 
3 1
2 1
(1 2 )²( , )
16
c cc cπ − +=  
Finally, to monopolize the industry, the first firm has to buy the remaining firm 
at the second stage The monopolization condition of second period has to take 
into account this future buying (by actualizing infinite flow of profits when it is 
necessary): 
3 1 2 3
2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1
( , ) ( ) ( , ) ( , )( , )
(1 ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 )
c c c c c c cc c π π π ππ δδ δ δ
⎡ ⎤− + − ≥⎢ ⎥− − − −⎣ ⎦ δ            (6) 
which is equivalent to: 
1 1(1 2 )² (1 2 )²
9 16(1 )
c c c c
δ
− + − +− −  
2 2
1 1 1(1 ) (1 2 ) (1 3 2 )
4(1 ) 9(1 ) 16(1 )
c c c cδ δ δ
⎡ ⎤− − + − ++ − ≥⎢ ⎥− − −⎣ ⎦
2c
δ  
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Appendix C
Now, concerning the first round, the triopoly profit of the firm 1 is: 
2
3 1
1 1
(1 3 2 )( , )
16
c cc cπ − +=  
About the opportunity cost of the firm 1 (the profit realized by the first firm if it 
buys no firm), it is given by: 
2
4 1
1 1
(1 4 3 )( , )
25
c cc cπ − +=  
Finally, the acquisition cost of a firm by the firm 1 is: 
2
4 1
2 1
(1 2 )( , )
25
c cc cπ − +=  
Finally, as to monopolize the industry, the first firm has to buy another firm at 
the second stage and the remaining one in the third stage, the monopolization 
condition of third period has to take into account these future buying (by 
actualizing infinite flow of profits when it's necessary): 
4 3
3 22 1 2 1
1 1 1 1
( , ) ( , )
( , ) ( , )
(1 ) (1 )
c c c cc c c cπ ππ δ πδ δ
⎡ ⎤− + −⎢ ⎥− −⎣ ⎦
 
1 2 4
2 1 1 1 1 1 1( ) ( , ) ( , )
(1 ) (1 ) (1 )
c c c cπ π πδ cδ δ δ
⎡ ⎤+ − ≥⎢ ⎥− − −⎣ ⎦
                           (12) 
which is equivalent to: 
2 2
1 1(1 3 2 ) (1 2 )
16 25(1 )
c c c c
δ
− + − +− −
2 2
1 1(1 2 ) (1 2 )
9 16(1 )
c c c cδ δ
⎡ ⎤− + − ++ −⎢ ⎥−⎣ ⎦
 
2 2
2 1 1 1(1 ) (1 2 ) (1 4 3 )
4(1 ) 9(1 ) 25(1 )
c c c cδ δ δ
⎡ ⎤− − + − ++ − ≥⎢ ⎥− − −⎣ ⎦
2c
δ  
Page 19 of 21
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
References
[1]  Charléty, P., S. Souam, (2002) "Analyse Economique des Fusions 
Horizontales," Revue Française d'Economie, Vol. 17, N °  2, pp. 37-68. 
[2]  Fauli-Oller, R. (2000) "Takeover Waves," Journal of Economics and 
Management Strategy, Vol. 9, N °  2, pp. 189-210. 
[3] Fridolfsson, S., J. Stennek, (2005) "Hold-up of Anti-Competitive 
Mergers," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Vol. 23, issues 9-
10, pp753-75.   
[4]    Gorwisankaran, G., and T. J. Holmes, (2004) "Mergers and the evolution 
of industry concentration : results from the dominant-firm model," RAND 
Journal of Economics, Vol. 35, Issue 3, p561, 22p. 
[5] Horn, H., L. Persson, (2001a), "Endogenous Mergers in Concentrated 
Markets," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Vol. 19, Issue 8, 
pp1213-44.  
[6]  Kamien, M., I. Zang, (1990) "The Limits of Monopolization Through 
Acquisition," Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 105, pp. 465-99. 
[7]  Kamien, M., I. Zang, (1993) "Monopolization by Sequential Acquisition," 
Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Vol. 9, N °  2, pp. 205-229. 
[8]  Letho, P., M. Tombak, (1998) "Consolidation and the Sequence of 
Acquisitions to Monopoly," Mimeo. 
[9]  Salant, S. W., S. Switzer, and R. J. Reynolds, (1983) "Losses from 
Horizontal Merger : The Effects of an Exogenous Change in Industry Structure 
on Cournot-Nash Equilibrium", 93, Quarterly Journal of Economics, pp. 185-
Page 20 of 21
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
99. 
[10]  Williamson, O. (1968) "Economics as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare 
Trade-offs", American Economic Review, Vol. 58, pp. 18-36. 
Page 21 of 21
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
